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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Boundaries-Parol Boundary Settlements--Statute of Frauds
A and B, owners of coterminous tracts of land, are uncertain
as to the correct physical location of the boundary line between them.
Their uncertainty arises honestly, though it might be resolved by
accurate survey related to a demonstrably better record title or by
resort to title by adverse possession in either party.1 Anxious to
resolve their honest dispute, the parties orally agree' upon the loca-
tion of a boundary line. This boundary is acquiesced in by both
parties and recognized in subsequent use. Thereafter one of the
parties or his assign' reneges and claims more than the land lying
on his side of the orally agreed boundary line. In resulting litiga-
tion, will the boundary line orally agreed upon be upheld against the
reneging party or his assignee?
A majority of jurisdictions uphold such agreements,4 even though
it is now possible to prove that the reneging party's claim is based
on what is demonstrably the true line.' In a recent case," the North
' This fact situation serves to define the scope of the problem to be dealt
with by this note. The treatment of this note, however, does not deal with
the established North Carolina law that contemporaneously erected monu-
ments control over actual calls in the deed. E.g., Dudley v. Jeffress, 178
N.C. 111, 100 S.E. 253 (1919); Millikin v. Sessoms, 173 N.C. 723, 92 S.E.
359 (1917).
'These parol agreements, like a written agreement to the same effect,
must be supported by sufficient consideration. E.g., McGinty v. Interstate
Land & Improvement Co., 92 Ga. App. 770, 90 S.E.2d 42 (1955). How-
ever, the definite settlement of a previously undefined or doubtful boundary
is sufficient consideration to uphold the agreement. E.g., Hotze v. Ring,
273 Ky. 48, 115 S.W.2d 311 (1938).
In the majority of jurisdictions, these parol settlements are binding upon
the parties and their successors in title. E.g., Huff v. Holley, 101 Ga. App.
292, 113 S.E.2d 493 (1960); Huffman v. Mills, 131 W. Va. 218, 46 S.E.2d
787 (1948).
'E.g., Clements v. Cox, 230 Ark. 818, 327 S.W.2d 83 (1959); Ernie v.
Trinity Lutheran Church, 51 Cal. 2d 702, 336 P.2d 525 (1959); Callaway
v. Armour, 207 Ga. 229, 60 S.E.2d 367 (1950) ; Turner v. Bowens, 180 Ky.
755, 203 S.W. 749 (1918); Schroeder v. Engroff, 52 N.J. Super. 88, 144
A.2d 808 (Super. Ct. 1958); Lynch v. Lynch, 236 S.C. 612, 115 S.E.2d
301 (1960); Webb v. Harris, 44 Tenn. App. 492, 315 S.W.2d 274 (1958).
See generally 2 TiTANY, REAL PROPERTY § 653 (3rd ed. 1939) ; Annot., 69
A.L.R. 1430, 1433 (1930).
'E.g., Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra note 4; Aldrich v.
Brownell, 45 R.I. 142, 120 Atl. 582 (1923); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co., 137 Tex. 59, 152 S.W.2d 711 (1941). But the agreement will be upheld
only in the absence of fraud or concealment by either party.
' Andrews v. Andrews, 252 N.C. 97, 113 S.E.2d 47 (1960).
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Carolina Supreme Court reserved decision on the point, raising a
query whether statements in prior decisions would preclude adopting
the majority rule.1
Despite the widespread acceptance of the majority rule as above
stated in general form, the decisions8 and the authorities9 inter-
preting them are confusing in their analysis of the problem itself
and the rationale of decision. The theories upon which such agree-
ments are sustained are variously stated as being estoppel,'" practical
location," or simply contract by parol agreement. 2  The only real
difficulty in sustaining them is of course that provided by the Statute
of Frauds. 3 Courts sustaining them surmount this difficulty either
head on by saying that there is no conveyance involved, 4 or in side-
' In this case the evidence showed that the true boundary line was ascer-
tainable as a matter of law and its location was thus possible by an accurate
survey. The court, in reserving decision on the question whether under
.any circumstances a subsequent parol agreement could fix a boundary line,
expressly stated that it can not be utilized where as here, the true boundary
line is "certain." Thus, the court has left the question open only with respect
to situations where the true boundary is "uncertain" in the objective sense-
that is its identity can not be established as a matter of law by reference to
paramount title muniments. This puts a more restricted meaning on "un-
certain" than do some courts which would find the requisite "uncertainty"
possible even in this factual context. E.g., Schneider v. Pascoe, 47 Cal.
App. 2d 709, 118 P.2d 860 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941), holding that the requisite
"uncertainty" refers simply to the subjective state of mind and that "un-
certainty" may exist even though an accurate survey could be made from
the calls in the deed.
' See, e.g., Callaway v. Armour, 207 Ga. 229, 60 S.E.2d 367 (1950);
Fuelling v. Fuesse, 43 Ind. App. 441, 87 N.E. 700 (1909); Winborn v.
Alexander, 39 Tenn. App. 1, 279 S.W.2d 718 (1954).
' See, e.g., Bua3y, REAL PROPERTY § 250 (2d ed. 1954) ; 6 THOMPSON,
REAL PROPERTY § 3299 (perm. ed. 1940) ; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4,
at § 653.
"E.g, Dunn v. Fletcher, 266 Ala. 273, 96 So. 2d 257 (1957) ; Johnson
v. Smith, 215 Ark. 247, 219 S.W.2d 926 (1949); Thomas v. Harlan, 27
Wash. 2d 512, 178 P.2d 965 (1947).
"1 E.g., Guy v. Lancaster, 250 Ala. 287, 34 So. 2d 499 (1948); Lake v.
Crosser, 202 Okla. 582, 216 P.2d 583 (1950).
2 E.g., Wright v. Anthony, 205 Ga. 47, 52 S.E.2d 316 (1949); Howard
v. Howard, 271 Ky. 773, 113 S.W.2d 434 (1938); Webb v. Harris, 44 Tenn.
App. 492, 315 S.W.2d 274 (1958); Huffman v. Mills, 131 W. Va. 218, 46
S.E.2d 787 (1948).
"3 The other possible reason for not sustaining these agreements is that
it would violate the parol evidence rule. This argument was rejected in
Diggs v. Kurtz, 132 Mo. 250, 33 S.W. 815 (1896), and Fehrman v. Bissell
Lumber Co., 188 Wis. 82, 205 N.W. 905 (1925), appeal dismissed, 274 U.S.
720 (1927). And certainly the parol evidence rule should not operate to
destroy the validity of such agreements which change or modify the original
instrument. Whitehurst v. FCX Fruit & Vegetable Serv., Inc., 224 N.C.
628, 32 S.E.2d 34 (1944)." E.g., Downing v. Boehringer, 82 Idaho 52, 349 P.2d 306 (1960);
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stepping fashion, by reliance upon possession and acquiescence. 15
Actually, depending upon the factual context giving rise to the dis-
pute and the resulting agreement, there may well be a conveyance
involved, so that the first ground for surmounting the Statute of
Frauds in those contexts is certainly questionable. Analysis of these
various factual contexts may therefore be helpful in anticipating what
course our court will follow when confronted with a proper case.
The dispute uniformly required'0 could and does arise for any
one of several reasons: (a) the true boundary line is described by
reference to variable geographical feature ;17 (b) the true boundary
line is described by a call which is intrinsically ambiguous so that
location by accurate survey is impossible;"s (c) the true boundary
line is described solely by reference to monuments which are not now
in existence, so that location by accurate survey is impossible;"O (d)
the parties are honestly in dispute by reason of an inartful descrip-
tion of monuments of lost but not indispensable monuments, neither
Jones v. Scott, 314 Ill. 118, 145 N.E. 378 (1924); Turner v. Bowens, 180
Ky. 755, 203 S.W. 749 (1918).
1 In order for the parol agreement to be valid, many jurisdictions require
that the parties assert possession up to the agreed line. E.g., Downing v.
Boehringer, supra note 14; Lynch v. Lynch, 236 S.C. 612, 115 S.E.2d 301
(1960); Van Deven v. Harvey, 9 Wis. 2d 124, 100 N.W.2d 587 (1960).
Why the possession is necessary does not appear from the decisions but
in 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 653, it is suggested that the taking of
possession constitutes part performance and removes the case from the Statute
of Frauds. Note, however, that North Carolina has not recognized the
doctrine of part performance in other contexts. E.g., Ballard v. Boyette,
171 N.C. 24, 86 S.E. 175 (1915). See generally Notes, 39 N.C.L. Rv.
96 (1960); 15 N.C.L. Rlv. 203 (1937). But cf. Herring v. Volume Mer-
chandise, Inc., 249 N.C. 221, 106 S.E.2d 197 (1958), holding that while an
oral executory surrender of a lease having more than three years to run
must be in writing an actual surrender of such a lease need not be in writing
to be enforceable since the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory, as
distingiushed from executed, contracts. See also Herring v. Volume Mer-
chandise, 252 N.C. 450, 113 S.E.2d 814 (1960) (same case on later appeal).
See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961). It would seem that this
same rule would apply to a parol settlement of a boundary dispute where
the parties have acquiesced in the settlement and recognized it in subsequent
use of the land.
1 In the absence of even subjective uncertainty or vagueness as to the
location of the boundary line, no parol agreement is admissible to alter the
true dividing line as this obviously would conflict with the Statute of Frauds.
E.g., Gee v. McDowell, 209 Ga. 265, 71 S.E.2d 532 (1952); Carver v.
Turner, 310 Ky. 99, 219 S.W.2d 409 (1949); May v. Abernathy, 23 Tenn.
App. 236, 130 S.W.2d 135 (1939).
"' Muchenberger v. City of Santa Monica, 206 Cal. 635, 275 Pac. 803
(1929)." Callaway v. Armour, 207 Ga. 229, 60 S.E.2d 367 (1950).
19Engle v. Beatty, 41 Ohio App. 477, 180 N.E. 269 (1931).
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of which make location by accurate survey impossible;2 (e) the
parties are honestly in dispute because of conflicting calls in their
respective muniments of title, although the true boundary could be
established by survey based upon the demonstrably better record
title.2
Courts sustaining the agreements have not generally discrim-
inated between these contexts. But it seems clear that (a), (b) and
(c), where the very identification of the true line as opposed to its
location is impossible, present clearer cases for holding no convey-
ance and hence no violation of the Statute of Frauds, than do (d)
and (e). Some courts have tacitly recognized this important line of
distinction by saying that (d) and (e) do not involve bona fide
disputes,22 others by pointing out more clearly that in these cases
where the true boundary is really ascertainable, i.e., is legally
identifiable, parol agreements purporting to vary it violate the
Statute of Frauds.23  The latter reasoning is certainly preferable,
since this goes to the heart of the matter, and since even in these
cases there may well be a subjectively "honest" or "bona fide" dis-
pute and uncertainty between the parties.
It is believed that in a proper case, one involving an objective un-
certainty of the (a), (b), or (c) type situations, nothing in previous
North Carolina cases would preclude the court from enforcing a sub-
sequent parol agreement fixing a disputed boundary line. Indeed, it
is in these very contexts that the court apparently reserved decision
in the Andrews 4 case.
The cases cited by the court as containing language which might
possibly preclude enforcement of such agreements appear to be those
involving no objective uncertainty.23 In each of the cases the line
"0 Andrews v. Andrews, 252 N.C. 97, 113 S.E.2d 47 (1960).
2This type of situation gives rise to a "lappage." Webb v. Harris, 44
Tenn. App. 492, 315 S.W.2d 274 (1958).
22 See, e.g., Brock v. Muse, 232 Ky. 293, 22 S.W.2d 1034 (1930).
:'E.g., Lacy v. Bartlett, 78 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
'Andrews v. Andrews, 252 N.C. 97, 113 S.E.2d 47 (1960).
" In Woodard v. Harrell, 191 N.C. 194, 132 S.E. 12 (1926), the court
found as a matter of law no ambiguity in the calls of the deeds intro-
duced by the plaintiff. Thus while there was subjective uncertainty, ob-
jective uncertainty was missing and the subsequent parol agreement was
not allowed. In Wiggins v. Rogers, 175 N.C. 67, 94 S.E. 685 (1917),
the court held that the subsequent parol agreement was incompetent to
show a line different from the true line. The facts given in the report
do not reveal whether the uncertainty was objective in nature, but it
probably was not since the established line could not be said to be at variance
with the true line unless the latter could be accurately established. Daniel v.
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was legally "certain," i.e., it could be made certain by accurate sur-
vey based upon the muniments of title. Hence, when the appropriate
case of true objective uncertainty does arise,2" North Carolina coun-
sel would seem to have had the door opened wide enough by the
Andrews2 7 dictum to argue persuasively for outright adoption of the
majority rule allowing enforcement of parol agreements in such
cases." Such a result would accord with generally accepted public
policy considerations. 9
J. DONNELL LASSITER
Charitable Trusts-Application of Cy Pres to a Discriminatory Trust
In a recent New Jersey decision1 the cy pres doctrine2 was
Tallassee Power Co., 204 N.C. 274, 168 S.E. 217 (1933), lacked the requisite
objective uncertainty as the court found the deeds were not ambiguous and
the boundary line could be made certain. Whether the uncertainty present
in Kirkpatrick v. McCracken, 161 N.C. 198, 76 S.E. 821 (1912), was ob-
jective in nature is inconclusive on the facts and opinion. In any event,
evidence of the subsequent parol agreement was admitted, although the
court said it felt the trial court had confined the evidence to the restricted
purpose of establishing damages.
"' And when counsel on trial is astute to make the record show that there
is objective uncertainty involved. It seems at least possible from reading
our cases that the absence up to now of clear analysis along the lines sug-
gested may be the result of failure by counsel clearly to develop this critical
point for the appellate records.
2'Andrews v. Andrews, 252 N.C. 97, 113 S.E.2d 47 (1960).
" It is unlikely that any of the parol agreements litigated in the past were
the result of specific counsel by lawyers. Of course, in the rare instance
where the lawyer's advice is sought ahead of time, the correct counsel is to
enter into a written and recorded boundary line agreement, whether the
dispute arises out of objective or merely subjective uncertainty.
' "These settlements of disputed, conflicting, or doubtful boundaries
should be encouraged by the courts as a means of suppressing spiteful and
vexatious litigation, and thus banishing from peaceful communities a fruitful
source of discord. 'Convenience, policy, necessity, justice-all unite in sus-
taining such an amicable agreement.'" McArthur v. Henry, 35 Tex. 801,
816 (1869). Quoted with approval in Sobol v. Gulinson, 94 Colo. 92, 95, 28
P.2d 810, 811 (1933).
1 Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961).
2 The cy pres doctrine is an equitable doctrine applied to prevent the
failure of a charitable trust when the settlor's scheme is, or has become, im-
practical, impossible, or illegal to carry out. It is based on the presumption
that his wishes will more nearly be fulfilled by alteration of the trust and
its application to a purpose "as near as possible" to his original intent,
rather than declaring a partial intestacy. See, e.g., Petition of Pierce, 153
Me. 180, 188, 136 A.2d 510, 515 (1957). See generally 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES §§ 431-41 (1953); FiscH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 399 (1959); 4
SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 399-.5 (2d ed. 1956); SHERIDAN & DELANY, THE CY-
PRES DOCTRINE (1959). The doctrine has gained wide acceptance in the
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